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INTRODUCTION
New computing, networking, IT security and outsourcing solutions are
revolutionizing healthcare and health research. An important application of
these technologies is the integration of genomic data into modern health systems.
The staggering size of genomic datasets makes it difficult for healthcare providers
and researchers to store, link and analyze them on any one server. Cloud
computing—a diverse set of technologies and business practices that facilitate the
storage, analysis and sharing of data—is already seen as essential for driving
genomic research, which itself is driven by Big Data.1 By the same logic, cloud
computing may soon be needed to facilitate the integration of genomic data into
healthcare contexts as molecular discoveries are translated into new clinical
applications.
This article considers how Canadian health privacy laws apply to cloud
computing in genomic research and medicine. We consider these laws because
genomic datasets contain personal health information (PHI), including both
genomic data (which is inherently individuating) and associated phenotypic and
clinical data. Health privacy laws regulate the collection, use, and disclosure of
personal health information,2 including the outsourcing of PHI processing to
service providers. While we focus on genomics in the cloud, our legal analysis
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1 Lincoln D. Stein et al, ‘‘Data Analysis: Create a Cloud Commons” (2015) 523:7559
Nature 149.
2 We refer to PHI throughout and not personal information generally. Our discussion
applies generally to PHI in the cloud. As a general rule, a custodian requires the
data subject’s consent to disclose PHI to a third party. Exceptionally, custodians
are permitted to transfer PHI to service providers, including cloud service
providers (CSPs), without the data subject’s consent. Such a transfer is only
permitted if the custodian and service provider establish a service contract (e.g., a
‘‘cloud contract”). This contract must minimally ensure that the service provider
protects the PHI and only uses it for authorized purposes. Some provincial laws
impose additional requirements for such contracts.
We review the legal requirements for conducting genomic research and
medicine in the cloud, identifying gaps in privacy protection, and variation in
protection across provinces. Given the technological, organizational, and multi-
jurisdictional complexity of cloud services, cloud contracts must address a host
of privacy concerns. Technologically speaking, cloud services involve dynamic
transfers between multiple data centres and endpoints, co-locate multiple clients
on any given server, and deliver access over the public Internet. Cloud contracts
must therefore ensure sophisticated security standards are met. Organizationally
speaking, cloud services involve many hand-offs of responsibility for privacy and
security as the data travel from custodian to data centre. Cloud contracts need to
ensure responsibility is appropriately allocated along the chain of custody.
Jurisdictionally, cloud services involve routine transfer and access across borders,
raising concerns over surveillance and compelled disclosure under foreign law.
These issues have come to a head with the European Court of Justice’s decisions
in Schrems on the adequacy of the EU-U.S. Safe Harbour data-sharing
framework, which found that mass surveillance by the U.S. government
undermined the European right to protection of personal data.3 By contrast,
Canadian policy debate on cross-border transfers remains relatively subdued.
Additional concerns are whether cloud services can comply with the laws of
multiple jurisdictions and whether individuals or responsible custodians can
enforce privacy related obligations practically when data are stored and
processed abroad. To reinforce our legislative review, we also review the
Terms of Service of six CSPs with offerings in Canada. Our review of cloud
contracts reveals that current contractual practices do not resolve adequately
legislative gaps in privacy protection.
In this article, we argue that more detailed requirements are needed for cloud
contracts involving the transfer of PHI if privacy is to be protected in cloud-
based genomics. These requirements should either be incorporated into
Canadian privacy laws, or issued as guidance by Canadian privacy
commissioners. The enhancement of privacy protections in the cloud also
needs to be coordinated nationally and internationally to minimize confusion
encompasses health sector laws that apply only to PHI, as well as public and private
sector laws that apply to PHI by virtue of it being a subset of personal information.
3 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, C-362/14, [unpublished], online:<curia.eur-
opa.eu> [Schrems].
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and promote the interoperability of standard cloud contracts across jurisdictions.
In the spirit of current regulation, new requirements would be drafted with
enough technical neutrality and flexibility to address emerging concerns, reflect
local contexts, and impose clear obligations while avoiding becoming mired in
soon-to-be-obsolete technical detail. Without meaningful protections for PHI
under cloud contracts, Canadian researchers and health care providers may be
reluctant to take advantage of cloud services, which is likely to hinder progress in
genomics and healthcare delivery.
This article presents results from a year-long research project reviewing
health privacy issues in the cloud, funded by the Contributions Program of the
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC). Section I provides a brief
primer on cloud computing and its applications in data-centric health research
and health care. Section II reviews Canadian privacy and health privacy laws and
how they apply to CSPs. Section III identifies privacy risks arising from the
technological, organizational, and jurisdictional complexity of cloud computing.
Section IV argues that Canadian health privacy laws fail to address difficulties
custodians face in balancing responsibilities with CSPs, determining whether
foreign laws offer comparable protection, and ensuring transparency is
maintained as data migrates to the cloud. In Section V, we survey standard
agreements (Terms of Service) and privacy policies of leading CSPs, arguing that
cloud contracts do not sufficiently address gaps in legislative protection for
privacy and security. In Section VI, we identify the discrepancies in Canadian
laws that apply to PHI which threaten interoperability of cloud contracts across
provinces. This review is the first comprehensive review of legal and contractual
privacy protections in the Canadian health sector. By identifying potential gaps
in protection, we aim to inform the business decisions and contractual practices
of both custodians and CSPs in Canada. By identifying discrepancies across
provinces, we also aim to stimulate cooperative reform and harmonization of
health privacy governance across Canada.
I. A BRIEF PRIMER ON CLOUD COMPUTING
(i) Table 1: Terminology and Acronyms
Cloud contract: synonym for ‘Terms of Service’ agreement governing a cloud
computing arrangement between a CSP and a custodian.
Cloud service provider (CSP): a company that offers some component of cloud
computing.
Custodian: an entity which has custody or control of personal health
information and is accountable under Canadian privacy law to protect that
information
De-identified information: under Canadian law, information that has been
rendered not identifiable.
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Identifying information: information about identifiable individuals—i.e.,
‘‘information that identifies an individual or for which it is reasonably
foreseeable that it could be utilized, either alone or with other information, to
identify an individual.”4
Personal health information (PHI): identifying information about an individual
that relates to physical or mental health—including the health history of the
individual’s family—or relates to the provision of health care to the individual.
Intended to be broad, and typically includes diagnostic, treatment, and care
information, health care provider information, registration information
(demographics, address, etc.), and information derived from bodily materials.5
Service provider: an entity that processes personal information on behalf of a
custodian.
Terms of Service: the complete agreement between custodian and CSP, usually
stipulated through terms and conditions in multiple documents (e.g., service
level agreement, privacy policy, acceptable use policy, terms of use).
(a) Cloud Computing
Cloud computing generally refers to technologies and business practices that
offer scalable, on-demand access to a configurable pool of computing resources
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) over the Internet.6
Cloud computing is, relatively speaking, low cost in terms of allowing access to
resources due to its ‘‘elasticity”: its on-demand services allow subscribers to pay
only for what they need and to automatically engage additional features.7 It
4 Michael Power,The Law of Privacy (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2013) at 2.22 (this is a
generic definition for Canada. For direct references and discussion of variation between
statutes, see subsection ‘‘Definition of Identifiable,” below). Also defined in research
guidelines: Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council of Canada & Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada, Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans
(Ottawa: Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research, 2014) at 57—59, online:
<www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/pdf/eng/tcps2-2014/TCPS_2_FINAL_Web.pdf> [TCPS].
5 Power, supra note 4 at 2.22. See, e.g.,Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5, s. 1(1)
[Alberta’sHIA]; Personal Health Information Privacy and Access Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. P-
7.05, s. 1 [New Brunswick’s PHIPA]; Personal Health Information Act, S.N. 2008, c. P-
7.01, s. 5(5) [Newfoundland’s PHIA]; Personal Health Information Protection Act, S.O.
2004, c. 3, Schedule A, s. 4(2) [Ontario’s PHIPA].
6 Jonathan J.M. Seddon & Wendy L. Currie, ‘‘Cloud Computing and Trans-Border
Health Data: Unpacking U.S. and EU Healthcare Regulation and Compliance” (2013)
2:4 Health Policy & Technology 229; US, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud Computing (Special
Publication 800-144 by Wayne Jansen & Timothy Grance) (Gaithersburg, MD: US
Department of Commerce, 2011) at vi, online: <nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-144.pdf> [NIST, Security & Privacy].
7 Howard Simkevitz, ‘‘Privacy in the Cloud,” online: (2013) 13:2 Ontario Bar Association
Privacy L. Rev. <www.oba.org/en/pdf/sec_news_pri_may13_PrivacyCloud_Simke-
vitz.pdf>.
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offers increased storage capacity and increasingly efficient processing.8 Provision
of services remotely allows multiple geographically dispersed collaborators to
rapidly access the same data.
Genomic researchers hope to reap several advantages from moving to a
cloud computing environment.9 First, the growth of a given genomic database
(which includes both genomic data derived from samples and associated health
data) may proceed at a rapid and unpredictable rate as samples are collected and
sequenced, or as the databases of smaller studies are aggregated. Cloud
computing services can be flexibly scaled to match need, thereby reducing
large upfront capital expenditures. Second, the cloud’s ability to provide remote
access benefits projects with multiple geographically disparate collaborators and
databases designed as platforms (e.g., ‘‘genomic biobanks”) for use by external
researchers internationally.10 Given the size of genomic databases, remote access
may even become necessary for genomic research. Researchers accessing genomic
databases already spend weeks downloading data to local servers. The cloud
allows analytic tools to be uploaded to the cloud instead, quickly and securely.11
Third, outsourcing computing services to commercial CSPs can relieve
researchers from the cost and IT burden of establishing and managing an
internal computing environment, including a significant measure of security
oversight, potentially making research more cost-effective.
While a healthcare or research institution or university may have the capacity
to launch its own ‘‘private” cloud, commercial services providing ‘‘public” clouds
are more often associated with scalable, remotely accessible, and affordable
cloud services. Cloud computing deployment models vary in ways that have
significant implications for participant (i.e., data subject) privacy. This article
focuses on public clouds because they already have established scale,
international scope, cost efficiencies, and security expertise difficult for private
clouds built from the ground up to rival—and because they raise more complex
privacy issues.
Public CSPs offer a variety of service categories. A cloud computing
environment is comprised of five conceptual layers. The bottom two layers are
‘‘physical”: basic facilities and computing hardware. The top three layers are
‘‘logical” or virtual: the ‘‘platform architecture layer” for software development,
and the ‘‘application layer” for end users.12 The physical layers typically remain
entirely under the control of the CSP, while the client can choose to interact to
8 Ibid.
9 See, e.g., Dov Greenbaum & Mark Gerstein, ‘‘The Role of Cloud Computing in
Managing the Deluge of Potentially Private Genetic Data” (2011) 11:11 American J.
Bioethics 39.
10 Cf Dov Greenbaum et al, ‘‘Genomics and Privacy: Implications of the New Reality of
Closed Data for the Field” (2011) 7:12 PLoS Computational Biology Special Section 1.
11 Edward S. Dove et al, ‘‘Genomic Cloud Computing: Legal and Ethical Points to
Consider” (2015) 23:10 European J. Human Genetics 1271.
12 NIST, Security & Privacy, supra note 6 at 5 [emphasis removed].
PROTECTING HEALTH INFORMATION IN THE CLOUD 177
varying degrees with the logical layers. Depending on the degree of desired
interaction, the form of cloud services can be described in one of three ways:
. Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS): provides researchers access to raw
computing hardware. They can upload their analytic software into the
cloud, run the software, and download the compiled results.
. Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS): offers a platform on which researchers can
develop and run applications to analyze research data.
. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS): offers researchers access to software appli-
cations they can run on the cloud.
Cloud services may also be layered. For example, a CSP offering a platform
or application may be established on the infrastructure of another CSP. Again,
the details ideally need not concern any particular downstream client. Various
commercial cloud computing platforms have emerged for genomic
researchers—such as Galaxy, Bionimbus, and DNAnexus—which allow
researchers to perform genomic analyses using only a web browser.13 In
addition to public and private cloud computing models, so-called ‘‘hybrid”
clouds exist.14 These hybrid clouds can offer unique privacy advantages by
allowing different pieces of information from the same source to be alternatively
secured and made more accessible, depending on the information’s sensitivity.15
(i) Table 2: Cloud Deployment Models
Private cloud: The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a
single organization comprising multiple consumers (e.g., business units). It may
be owned, managed, and operated by the organization, a third party, or some
combination of both, and it may exist on or off premises.
Community Cloud: The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by
a specific community of consumers from organizations with shared concerns
(e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance considerations). It
may be owned, managed, and operated by one or more of the organizations in
the community, a third party, or some combination of them, and it may exist
on or off premises.
Public Cloud: The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use by the
general public. It may be owned, managed, and operated by a business,
13 Dove et al, supra note 11.
14 US,TheNISTDefinition ofCloudComputing:Recommendations of theNational Institute
of Standards and Technology (Special Publication 800-145 by Peter Mell & Timothy
Grance) (Gaithersburg, MD: US Department of Commerce, 2011) at 3, online:
<nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-145.pdf>.
15 ‘‘Hybrid Cloud Computing: Establishing a Definition & Discovering the True Benefits
of a Hybrid Approach,” Cybertrend: Technology for Business 13:2 (February 2015) 8,
online: <www/cybertrend.com>.
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academic, or government organization, or some combination of them. It exists
on the premises of the cloud provider.
Hybrid Cloud: The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more distinct
cloud infrastructures (private, community, or public) that remain unique
entities, but are bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that
enables data and application portability (e.g., cloud bursting for load balancing
between clouds).16
To reiterate, commercial cloud services typically have five elements:
1. On-demand self-service: the client can automatically request computation
and storage.
2. Broad network access: resources available over a network (i.e., the
Internet) for access with standard devices.
3. Resource pooling: multi-tenant model (discussed below)
4. Rapid elasticity: of computing and storage capabilities.
5. Measured service: various aspects of use are measured for customer
transparency and automatic service optimization.17
However, the benefits of the cloud coincide with drawbacks. The inner
architecture of the full cloud computing environment18 remains significantly
more complicated than the virtual computing portal accessed by the client, who
can remain ignorant of the robust ‘‘back-end” for which the CSP remains
responsible. Although this model can advantageously insulate clients from the
cloud’s technical details, it also tends to place them at its mercy.19
(b) Cloud Services in Canadian Healthcare and Health Research
Commercial cloud services have many existing and potential applications to
healthcare and health research. On the SaaS end of the spectrum, a number of
generic and health services-specific uses of cloud services are used for document
management, storage, patient-management, billing, webhosting, email, and
teleconferencing.20 However, the real pressure to adopt cloud computing is felt in
data-centric health research and medicine, fueled by advances in genomic
16 US,CloudComputing Synopsis and Recommendations: Recommendations of theNational
Institute of Standards and Technology (Special Publication 800-146 by Lee Badger et al)
(Gaithersburg, MD: US Department of Commerce, 2012), online: <nvlpubs.nist.gov/
nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-146.pdf>.
17 Canada Health Infoway, ‘‘Cloud Computing in Health: White Paper” (2012) at 11,
online: <https://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/en/component/edocman/545-cloud-com-
puting-in-health-white-paper-full/view-document>.
18 Irrespective of whether it takes the form of IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS.
19 See generally David Lametti, ‘‘The Cloud: Boundless Digital Potential or Enclosure
3.0?” (2012) 17:3 Va. J.L. & Tech 190.
20 Carolina A. Klein, ‘‘Cloudy Confidentiality: Clinical and Legal Implications of Cloud
Computing in Health Care” (2011) 39:4 J. American Academy Psychiatry & L. Online
571.
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sequencing, medical imaging and bioinformatics.21 In this article, we focus on the
expanding demand of cloud services in genomic research. Genome-wide
association studies (GWAS), which compare genetic variants across many
individuals, have proven to be an excellent way of identifying common genetic
variants associated with health and disease.22 Advances in computational
biology and bioinformatics have accelerated the translation of genomic research
findings into clinical applications.23 Several trends in genomic research have led
to the development of vast datasets, comprising genomic and associated health
data from a large number of individuals: ‘‘[t]he confluence of cheap computing
and high-throughput sequencing technologies is making genomic data
increasingly easy to collect, store, and process. At the same time, genomic data
is being integrated into a wide range of applications in diverse settings.”24
While computing demand is currently acute in research, this will eventually
also be the case for healthcare when it begins to integrate this deluge of genomic
data into clinical decision-making. The cost of genomic sequencing has sharply
declined in recent years, contributing to a significant increase in the amount of
available genomic data.25 A combination of inputs emanating from the personal
genomics industry, grassroots patient projects, and academic research efforts
have led to hundreds of thousands of genetic sequences being deposited and
made accessible online.26 Significant efforts have been made to make this data
21 Vivien Marx, ‘‘Genomics in the Clouds” (2013) 10:10 Nature Methods 941.
22 David Altshuler et al, ‘‘Creating a Global Alliance to Enable Responsible Sharing of
Genomic and Clinical Data” (Proceedings of the Global Alliance for Genomics and
Health Conference, New York, 3 June 2013) [unpublished], online: <https://
www.broadinstitute.org/files/news/pdfs/GAWhitePaperJune3.pdf>; Heidi Ledford,
‘‘Genome hacker uncovers largest-ever family tree” Nature News (30 October 2013),
online: <www.nature.com/news/genome-hacker-uncovers-largest-ever-family-tree-
1.14037>; Erin M. Ramos et al, ‘‘A Mechanism for Controlled Access to GWAS
Data: Experience of the GAIN Data Access Committee” (2013) 92:4 American J.
Human Genetics 479.
23 Greenbaum et al, supra note 10; David Haussler et al, ‘‘A Million Cancer Genome
Warehouse” (2012) Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, University of
California at BerkeleyTechnical Report No. UCB/EECS-2012-211, online:
<www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2012/EECS-2012-211.html>; Lincoln D.
Stein, ‘‘The Case for Cloud Computing in Genome Informatics” (2010) 11:5 Genome
Biology 207.
24 Muhammad Naveed et al, ‘‘Privacy in the Genomic Era,” online: (2015) arXiv at 29,
<arXiv.org>.
25 Mark Gerstein & Dov Greenbaum, ‘‘Proceed with caution,” The Scientist (1 October 1
2013), online: <www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/37592/title/Proceed-
with-Caution>; Eilene Zimmerman, ‘‘The race to a $100 genome,” CNN Money (25
June 2013), online: <money.cnn.com/2013/06/25/technology/enterprise/low-cost-gen-
ome-sequencing>; U.S., National Human Genome Research Institute, DNA Sequen-
cing Costs (15 January 2016), online: <www.genome.gov/sequencingcosts>.
26 US, National Center for Biotechnology Information,Human Genome Resources (2013),
online: <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genome/guide/human>.
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available to the widest audiences possible, and an important amount of it is now
even accessible online without restriction.27 Some of this data is sensitive or
clearly associated with an identifiable person. In order to compare genotypes,
rich phenotypic data (such as disease outcomes in medical records) and
environmental data are being increasingly collected, and Big Data analytics are
now being adopted in health research. Researchers are reaching out beyond
standard clinical and genomic health data to other sources of personal data.28
Effective genomic analysis requires, among other things, a significant
amount of computing and storage capability to mine these research data.
Existing research initiatives are becoming incapable of individually assembling
the requisite technological tools and infrastructure necessary to perform such
analyses. Many genomic researchers now feel that cloud computing is the only
model that can provide the storage and processing power needed for Big Data
genomic research.29 It has become common for genomic research projects to
require storage reaching multiple petabytes in size.30 These data masses are
problematic not only from the standpoint of storage space, but also from the
standpoint of data analysis and data sharing between researchers. These
limitations have been noted in the context of health-record storage,31 and the
provision of (open) access to genomic research databases.32
Big Data strategies and analytics are becoming common in genomic research
and may significantly change the nature of healthcare. Big Data genomics
involves ‘‘vast stores of information gathered from both traditional sources and,
increasingly, new collection points.”33 As researchers turn to new sources for
research data (e.g., genomic samples already collected in the context of clinical
27 Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Balancing Privacy Protections with Open,
Collaborative, Biomedical Research: Implications for Updating the CIHR Privacy Best
Practices Document, by Yann Joly, Anne-Marie Tassé & EdwardDove (Ottawa: CIHR,
2011).
28 Alex Pentland, Todd G. Reid & Tracy Heibeck, ‘‘Revolutionizing Medicine and Public
Health: Report of the Big Data and Health Working Group” (2013), online: <https://
kit.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/WISH_BigData_Report.pdf>.
29 Jacqueline Vanacek, ‘‘How Cloud and Big Data are Impacting the Human Genome—-
Touching 7Billion Lives” (16April 2012), SAPVoice (blog), online:<www.forbes.com/
sites/sap/#6aba80d35a42>.
30 Dove et al, supra note 11.
31 Amy L.McGuire et al, ‘‘Confidentiality, Privacy, and Security of Genetic and Genomic
Test Information in Electronic healthRecords: Points toConsider” (2008) 10:7Genetics
in Medicine 495.
32 Jane Kaye et al, ‘‘Data Sharing in Genomics—Re-shaping Scientific Practice” (2009)
10:5 Nature Reviews Genetics 331 at 334.
33 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Privacy and Cyber Security:
Emphasizing Privacy Protection in Cyber Security Activities” (Gatineau: OPC,
December 2014) at 4, online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-re-
cherche/2014/cs_201412_e.pdf> [OPC, ‘‘Privacy & Computer Security”].
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care) and combine multiple existing data sources into larger collections, several
existing privacy concerns are intensified, while others newly emerge.
II. PRIVACY LAWS AND HEALTH PRIVACY LAWS IN CANADA
A complex assortment of legal and regulatory frameworks govern privacy in
Canada.34 This article focuses on the privacy laws that regulate the collection,
use and disclosure of PHI by health custodians.35 These laws apply to
‘‘custodians”—individuals or organizations with custody or control over
personal information or PHI.36 They also apply to service providers (including
CSPs) who store, analyze, or otherwise process PHI on behalf of custodians.
References to and acronyms for major Canadian privacy laws can be found in
Appendix 1. Personal information generally refers to information about
identifiable individuals, and is sometimes defined as identifying
information—i.e., ‘‘information. . .for which it is reasonably foreseeable that it
could. . .either alone or with other information. . .identify an individual.”37 Most
provinces have health sector privacy laws that apply specifically to custodians of
PHI. In Canada, PHI is a subset of personal information that relates to health. It
is:
34 David Krebs, ‘‘Regulating the Cloud: A Comparative Analysis of the Current and
Proposed Privacy Frameworks in Canada and the European Union” (2012) 10:1
C.J.L.T. 29 at 50; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Reaching for the
Cloud(s): Privacy Issues related to Cloud Computing” (Gatineau: OPC, March 2010),
online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-recherche/2010/
cc_201003_e.pdf> [OPC, ‘‘Reaching for the Clouds”]; ChristopherKuner, Transborder
Data Flows and Data Privacy Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 174-175.
35 See Appendix 1 for a list of Canadian privacy statutes. See also Power, supra note 4 at
5.104;Canadian Institutes ofHealthResearch, by PatriciaKosseim, ed, 2nd ed byAdam
Kardash & Antonella Penta (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada,
2005) at 211, online: <publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2007/cihr-irsc/MR21-
22-2005E.pdf>. Other statutory and common law regimes also govern privacy in the
health context, but are not discussed here (e.g., An Act respecting health services and
social services, R.S.Q. c. S-4.2; Public Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40) Health
researchers are additionally bound by national ethics policies, and oversight from
research community self-regulatory bodies (e.g., research ethics boards, data access
committees).
36 Power, supra note 4 at 5.13. See e.g., Personal Information Protection and Electronic
DocumentsAct, S.C. 2000, c. 5, s. 4(1) [PIPEDA]; Alberta’sHIA, supra note 5, s. 1(1)(f);
Health Information Protection Act, S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021, s. 2(t) [Saskatchewan’sHIPA];
Personal Health Information Act, S.M. 2008, c. 41, s. 1(1) [Manitoba’s PHIA]; Ontario’s
PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 3; An Act respecting the protection of personal information in the
private sector, R.S.Q., c. P-39.1, ss. 4ff [Quebec’s PPIPS]; New Brunswick’s PHIPA,
supra note 5, s. 1; Personal Health Information Act, S.N.S. 2010, c. 41, s. 3(f) [Nova
Scotia’s PHIA]; Health Information Act, S.P.E.I. 2014, c. 31, s. 1(e) [not yet in force;
Prince Edward Island’s HIA]; Newfoundland’s PHIA, supra note 5, s. 4; Health
Information Privacy and Management Act, S.Y. 2013, c. 16, s. 2(1) [Yukon’s HIPMA].
37 For direct citations and variation between statutes, see subsection ‘‘Definition of
Identifiable” infra .
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identifying information about an individual in oral or recorded form if
it relates to the physical or mental health of the individual, including
the health history of the individual’s family, or relates to the provision
of health care to the individual. This is meant to capture a broad swath
of information, including diagnostic, treatment and care information...;
health care provider information...; and registration information (e.g.,
patient demographic information, patient address and contact infor-
mation, patient eligibility and billing information).38
Both federal and provincial laws may apply to the processing of personal
information in the private sector. Constitutionally speaking, federal jurisdiction
over personal information is grounded in the trade and commerce power,
provincial jurisdiction in the property and civil rights power.39 The Privacy Act
governs federal public sector custodians (mainly government institutions).40 The
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)
governs all federal and provincial private sector organizations by default.41 In
addition to their own public and private sector laws, provinces may also have
health sector privacy laws, as provinces have general jurisdiction over health
matters.42 Provincial health sector laws apply specifically to custodians of PHI to
the exclusion of provincial private or public sector statutes. In provinces without
health sector laws, PHI is still protected by provincial public or private sector
laws as a type of personal information.43 Provincial health sector statutes and (in
their absence) private sector statutes only displace federal law whenever they
have been deemed to be ‘‘substantially similar” to PIPEDA by the federal
government.44 Even then, PIPEDA continues to apply whenever PHI travels
38 Power, supra note 4 at 2.21. See e.g., Alberta’s HIA, supra note 5, s. 1(1)(k);
Saskatchewan’s HIPA, supra note 36, s. 2(m); Manitoba’s PHIA, supra note 36, s.
1(1); Ontario’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 4; New Brunswick’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 1;
Nova Scotia’sPHIA, supra note 36, s. 3(r); Prince Edward Island’sHIA, supra note 36, s.
1(t).
39 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II,
No. 5, ss. 91—92.
40 Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21.
41 PIPEDA, supra note 36.
42 Interpretation under Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 39, s. 92(16). See Schneider v.
British Columbia, 1982 CarswellBC 241, 1982 CarswellBC 741, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112, 139
D.L.R. (3d) 417, [1982] S.C.J. No. 64 (S.C.C.).
43 See Rousseau v. Wyndowe, 2006 CF 1312, 2006 FC 1312, 2006 CarswellNat 3486, 2006
CarswellNat 4832, 56Admin. L.R. (4th) 92 , [2006] F.C.J.No. 1631 (F.C.), reversed 2008
CAF 39, 2008 FCA 39, 2008 CarswellNat 246, 2008 CarswellNat 1530, 373 N.R. 301,
[2008] F.C.J. No. 151 (F.C.A.).
44 As certified by a formal Order-in-Council, on the recommendation of the OPC,
according to the following criteria: ‘‘[L]aws that are substantially similar: provide
privacy protection that is consistent with and equivalent to that found under PIPEDA;
incorporate the ten principles in Schedule 1 of PIPEDA; provide for an independent and
effective oversight and redress mechanism with powers to investigate; and restrict the
collection, use and disclosure of personal information to purposes that are appropriate
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across provincial or national borders. Currently, eight provinces have health
privacy laws. To date, three have been deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA
(Ontario’s PHIPA, New Brunswick’s PHIPA, Newfoundland’s PHIA); five have
not (Alberta’s HIA, Manitoba’s PHIA, Nova Scotia’s PHIA, Saskatchewan’s
HIPA, Prince Edward Island’s HIA).
In short, Canada has a general private sector privacy framework (PIPEDA),
as well as specific provincial rules that apply to the collection, use and disclosure
of PHI in the health sector. By contrast, Europe has a general privacy
framework, the EU Data Protection Directive, which applies to any entity
(public or private, individual or organization) that is a ‘‘controller” of personal
information or PHI.45 The U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA), and more specifically its Privacy Rule, applies federally across the
U.S. health sector, but only to specific categories of health sector custodians (i.e.,
‘‘covered entities”), including healthcare providers, health plans, and healthcare
clearinghouses, as well as their business associates (e.g., CSPs).46
Canadian privacy laws limit collection, use and disclosure of PHI to
purposes authorized by individual consent or by law. The drafting and
interpretation of Canadian privacy laws were heavily influenced by the Fair
Information Practice Principles originally set out in the 1980 OECD Guidelines47
and incorporated formally or informally into Canadian privacy laws.48 These
principles require custodians to safeguard personal information, notify
individuals of information handling practices, seek consent to processing, and
to allow individuals to access their personal information, among others. If a
custodian or CSP fails to respect privacy obligations, an individual may
complain to the appropriate privacy commissioner, whose office is established
through the relevant privacy statute. In response, privacy commissioners in
Canada have varying powers to make recommendations or compliance orders,
such as a cease-and-desist order, to address the complaint.49
or legitimate”(Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Legal Information
related to PIPEDA: Substantially Similar Provincial Legislation” (OPC, 2013), online:
<priv.gc.ca/leg_c/legislation/ss_index_e.asp>.
45 EC,Directive 95/46/EC of the EuropeanParliament and of the Council of 24October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, [1995] O.J., L. 281/31 at art 2(d) [EC, Directive 95/46]. As we
discuss below, the Directive is due to be replaced in mid-2018 with a General Data
Protection Regulation.
46 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996), 45 C.F.R. § 160, 164 (1996) [HIPAA Privacy Rule].
47 OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation, OECD Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, (1980), online:
<www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransbor-
derflowsofpersonaldata.htm> [OECD, 1980 Guidelines].
48 See, e.g., PIPEDA, supra note 36, Schedule 1.
49 Council of Canadian Academies, Accessing Health and Health-Related Data in Canada:
The Expert Panel on Timely Access to Health and Social Data for Health Research and
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Recognizing the necessity of data outsourcing, Canadian privacy laws permit
custodians to transfer PHI to a service provider without individual consent.50
The minimum conditions for such a transfer are that the custodian binds the
service provider by contract to:
1. limit use of PHI to purposes authorized by the custodian, and
2. protect the privacy and security of the PHI (i.e., take reasonable steps to
secure the PHI against loss, theft, or unauthorized use or disclosure).51
These minimum contractual requirements are reinforced by the accountability
principle, which requires custodians to ensure a comparable level of protection
for PHI processed by a third party.52 Service providers who fail to respect these
minimum conditions may be regulated directly as custodians. The OPC has
opined that transfers of PHI to CSPs satisfying these conditions are permitted
under PIPEDA.53
It should be noted that most major CSPs operating in Canada are based in
the United States.54 This can raise some legal challenges, as we discuss below,
Health System Innovation (Ottawa: CCA, 2015) at 197-198, online: <www.scienceadvi-
ce.ca/uploads/eng/assessments%20and%20publications%20and%20news%20relea-
ses/Health-data/HealthDataFullReportEn.pdf>. See e.g., Personal Information
Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5, s. 54 [Alberta’s PIPA]; Personal Information
Protection Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 63, s. 52 [British Columbia’s PIPA]; Quebec’s PPIPS,
supra note 36, s. 55; Ontario’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 61(4); Newfoundland’s PHIA,
supra note 5, ss.72, 74; New Brunswick’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 75;Manitoba’s PHIA,
supranote 36, s. 48.1; Saskatchewan’sHIPA, supranote 36, s. 48(1);Alberta’sHIA, supra
note 5, s. 80; Nova Scotia’s PHIA, supra note 36, s. 92.
50 Power, supra note 4 at 5.104; Kosseim, Kardash & Penta, supra note 35 at 211. Health
privacy laws with explicit ‘‘information manager” provisions include Alberta’s HIA,
supranote 5, s. 66(1);Manitoba’sPHIA, supranote 36, s. 1(1);NewBrunswick’sPHIPA,
supranote 5, s. 1;Newfoundland’sPHIA, supra note 5, s. 2(1)(1); Saskatchewan’sHIPA,
supra note 36, s. 2(j).
51 Power, supra note 4 at 7.44. See e.g., Alberta’s HIA, supra note 5, s. 66(2); Manitoba’s
PHIA, supra note 36, s. 25(3); New Brunswick’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 52(1);
Newfoundland’sPHIA, supra note 5, s. 22(2). For theUS approach, seeHIPAAPrivacy
Rule, supra note 45, § 164.502(e), 164.532(d),(e), online: US Department of Health &
Human Services <www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/
businessassociates.html>; see also EC, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
Opinion 05/2012 onCloudComputing (Brussels: EC, 2012) at 3.3, online:<ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/
wp196_en.pdf> [EC, Opinion 05/2012].
52 PIPEDA, supra note 36, Schedule 1, 4.1.3.
53 OPC, ‘‘Reaching for the Clouds,” supra note 34 at 13.
54 Or at the very least, outside of Canada. The Canadian-based cloud data centre run by
Digital Ocean, for example, remains relatively anomalous. See Digital Ocean,
‘‘Introducing Our New Canadian Datacenter: TOR1,” online: <digitalocean.com/
company/blog/introducing-our-new-canadian-datacenter-tor1>. From a health-sector
perspective, the Canadian cloud infrastructure project the Cancer Genome Collabora-
tory is also worthy of mention. Among its goals are transferring control of a cloud from
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because although Canadians may be adversely impacted by the application of
U.S. practices such as government surveillance, Canada cannot easily exert
jurisdiction over U.S.-based CSPs, and enforcing privacy rights in foreign
jurisdictions presents practical challenges. The EU faces similar problems.55 The
centrepiece of the EU solution to this type of problem, sometimes referred to as
the ‘‘adequacy” approach, is to prohibit personal data transfer outside the EU
unless the EU Commission has ruled that the foreign legal framework to which
the data are being transferred maintains adequate privacy protections.56 No U.S.
data-privacy law of general application has been deemed adequate, but EU-U.S.
transfers have sometimes relied upon an industry self-certification program
specifically designed for this purpose called the EU-U.S. Safe Harbour
Framework.57 As noted above, the EU Commission’s finding that the Safe
Harbour provided adequate protection for the purpose of personal data transfer
outside the EU was recently invalidated by the European Court of Justice due to
concerns over mass surveillance by U.S. law enforcement.58 In Canada,
considerably less attention has been paid to the robustness of foreign laws to
which Canadians’ data are sent. Two public sector acts in Canada that restrict
cross-border transfers are discussed below.59 Custodians, rather than
government, are presumably responsible under the accountability principle to
assess the adequacy of foreign laws. As we discuss below, the EU imposes strict
contractual terms on transfers to service providers outside the EU. Given its
market size, Europe may have more ability to dictate the terms of transfer to the
cloud than Canada.
Yet, to ensure that privacy is sufficiently protected in the cloud, an effective
legal privacy framework must ensure the respective obligations of custodians and
CSPs are clearly defined. The framework must also provide meaningful
mechanisms for regulators and individuals to enforce these obligations.
CSPs to the health research sector itself. See Cancer Genome Collaboratory, ‘‘Cloud
computing for collaborative research,” online: <cancercollaboratory.org>. In the
interest of full disclosure, authors of this article have been directly involved in the
Collaboratory project.
55 Although arguably to a decreasing degree, as cloud infrastructure has now begun to be
developed in the European Union. See e.g., Jeff Barr, ‘‘Now Open—AWS Germany
(Frankfurt) Region—EC2, DynamoDB, S3, andMuchMore” (23 October 2014), AWS
Official Blog (blog), online: <aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/aws-region-germany>.
56 See EC, Directive 95/46, supra note 45, art 25. This approach is being maintained in
Article 41 of the General Data Protection Regulation (EC, Proposal for a regulation of
the European Parliament and of the council on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data
Protection Regulation) [2012], online: <ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/docu-
ment/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf>, which is set to supercede the Directive.
57 Export.gov, ‘‘Welcome to theU.S.-EU&U.S.-Swiss SafeHarbor Frameworks,” online:
<export.gov/safeharbor>.
58 See Schrems, supra note 3.
59 See section 5(b), below, ‘‘Assessing Protections under Foreign Laws.”
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Contracts between custodians and CSPs (i.e., ‘‘cloud contracts”) are essential to
ensuring effective protection of PHI in Canada. In the next section, we review the
privacy and legal compliance issues in the cloud.
III. PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE CLOUD
While cloud computing promises to facilitate data-centric health research
and healthcare,60 it remains challenging for custodians to contractually ensure
the security and privacy of PHI in the cloud.61 Privacy and security risks in the
cloud are not entirely novel, but come in new and complex combinations. They
also present themselves to health custodians unfamiliar with advanced IT and
service relationships.62 Here, we review privacy concerns arising from the
technological, organizational, and multi-jurisdictional complexity of cloud
computing. Subsequent sections in this article will discuss whether existing
statutory and contractual privacy protections sufficiently address these concerns.
(a) Technological
The cloud employs a complex computing and networking architecture in
order to offer cost efficiency, flexible scale, and remote access over the public
Internet. This complex architecture presents arcane security risks, belied by the
simple interfaces presented to users.63 CSPs typically store the data of multiple
clients on a single server. An attack on or seizure of one client’s data may affect
others.64 Delivering remote access over the public Internet risks online attacks,
which are increasingly frequent and sophisticated.65 The privacy silver lining is
that the uniformity of the CSPs’ computing environment enables better
automation of security-management activities, and may centralize auditing and
compliance functions.66 In addition, switching away from direct download
toward remote access has the benefit of sequestering data in the cloud and
limiting the number of copies in circulation.67 Risks associated with cloud
60 Krebs, supra note 34 at 34; Canada Health Infoway supra note 17 at 20—24.
61 AndreaPeterson, ‘‘All YourMedicalData in theCloud?Not SoFast, SaysHHSPrivacy
Official” ThinkProgress (9 January 2013), online: <thinkprogress.org/health/2013/01/
09/1422081/medical-data-privacy>.
62 NIST, Security & Privacy, supra note 6 at 37; Krebs, supra note 34 at 34—35.
63 NIST, Security & Privacy, supra note 6 at 10—11.
64 Krebs, supra note 34 at 35. See also Yinqian Zhang et al, ‘‘Cross-VM Side Channels and
Their Use to Extract Private Keys” in Ting Yu, CCS ’12: The Proceedings of the 2012
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, October 16—18, 2012,
New York (New York: Association for Computing Machinery, 2012) 305.
65 OPC, ‘‘Privacy&Computer Security”, supranote 33 at 1; InternationalOrganization for
Standardization, ‘‘ISO/IEC 18028-2:2006: Information Technology—Security Techni-
ques—IT Network Security—Part 2: Network Security Architecture” (ISO, 2006),
online: <www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=40009>.
66 NIST, Security & Privacy, supra note 6 at 9.
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architecture should be considered against the existing risks of internal computing
environments.
However, ‘‘[c]loud providers can be reluctant to provide details of their
security and privacy measures and status, however, since such information is
often considered proprietary and might otherwise be used to devise an avenue of
attack.”68 Security through obscurity conflicts with the privacy principle of
transparent data-handling practices.69 Custodians cannot continuously monitor
the CSP’s security without its cooperation, as key aspects of the computing
environment are under the CSP’s exclusive control.70 The industry has developed
a number of privacy and security standards.71 It is important that such standards
are clearly addressed in cloud contracts.
(b) Organizational
The cloud may involve multiple hand-offs of personal information to
subcontractors and between data centres, creating uncertainty about where data
resides and who is responsible for ensuring privacy and security. Indeed,
subcontracting is prevalent in the cloud.72 Many providers layer their services on
top of the infrastructure of others. In service relationships generally, PHI is
exposed to an expanded risk environment. This may be particularly true in the
cloud, where information is not only transferred to and from the cloud, but also
between multiple intra-cloud locations. Outsourcing expands the circle of
insiders on whom privacy protection depends to include the CSP staff and
subcontractors, and potentially even other cloud clients when, for example,
information is stored in a multi-tenant environment.73 CSPs may also attract
increased attention by entities that aim to breach safeguards as valuable
information becomes concentrated in their data centres.74 On the other hand,
CSPs have a larger capacity to invest and specialize in IT security; to employ
67 Ibid at 10.
68 Ibid at 20; See also Nicholette Zeliadt, ‘‘Cryptographic Methods Enable Analyses
without Privacy Breaches” (2014) 20:6 Nature Medicine 563.
69 Brad Smith, ‘‘Building Confidence in the Cloud: A Proposal for Industry and
Government Action for Europe to Reap the Benefits of Cloud Computing” (Brussels:
Microsoft, 2010), online: <ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0003/contri-
butions/organisations/microsoft_corporation_2nd_document_en.pdf>.
70 NIST, Security & Privacy, supra note 6 at 20.
71 For further information, industry standards for cloud and network privacy and security
are detailed in the Cloud Security Alliance, ‘‘Cloud Controls Matrix Working Group”
(Cloud Security Alliance, 2014), online: <https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/group/
cloud-controls-matrix>.
72 US, Executive Office of the President, President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology,Report to the President: Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective
(Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2015) at 3.3.1—3.3.2.
73 NIST, Security & Privacy, supra note 6 at 18.
74 Ibid at 29.
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state-of-the-art encryption, firewall, and auditing techniques; to update practices
to keep pace with ever-emerging vulnerabilities75; and to rely on personnel who
can specialize in implementing internationally recognized good security and
privacy practices.76
Outsourcing PHI processing and storage also raises questions about
reliability of service and data integrity, especially when the service relationship
terminates, either in the course of business or when the CSP goes bankrupt. Since
at least 2007, cloud services such as Zimki, Nirvanix, and Google Health have
withdrawn their services on short notice, forcing clients to quickly find a means
to migrate their data to an alternative provider.77 A Quebec lawsuit in 2014 was
launched after a service provider deleted data belonging to a client who refused
to pay an additional fee to have the dynamic cloud data exported to a usable file
format.78 Cloud clients need an exit strategy to ensure they are able to recover
their data; to limit the CSP’s data access rights; and to ensure that the CSP
securely purges their data, including backup or redundant copies.79
The central privacy issue for custodians in a cloud service relationship is that
they cede significant control to a CSP over:
i. the PHI,
ii. the privacy and security parameters, and
iii. the ability to verify and monitor the implementation and effectiveness of
these parameters.80
The principal-agent problem arises in relationships where the client and the
CSP’s incentives or obligations to ensure privacy and security differ. The
problem of divergent incentives is likely to be stark where the CSP imposes
standard form Terms of Service, reserves the right to modify terms unilaterally,
disclaims liability, or where its cost for failed enforcement is lower than the cost
of meeting the contractual standards.81 The client may be able to ensure that the
information will receive comparable protection in the cloud as it would otherwise
through contract, independent certification, compliance review, or by requiring a
demonstration of the CSPs’ capabilities.82 Comprehensive best practices relating
to the service relationship in the cloud are available from the Cloud Security
75 Dove et al, supra note 11.
76 NIST, Security & Privacy, supra note 6 at 48.
77 TimAnderson, ‘‘Zimki closure shows the perils of hosted web platforms” (27 September
2007), Tim Anderson’s ITWriting (blog), online: <itwriting.com/blog/337-zimki-
closure-shows-the-perils-of-hosted-web-platforms.html>; Dove et al, supra note 11.
78 Dcade Veloneige inc. c. 9230-3437 Québec inc. (Solutions Emerge), 2014 QCCQ 4721,
2014 CarswellQue 12673, EYB 2014-245172 (C.Q.).
79 NIST, Security & Privacy, supra note 6 at 50-51.
80 Canada Health Infoway, supra note 17.
81 NIST, Security & Privacy, supra note 6 at 17.
82 Ibid at vii, 48.
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Alliance, a non-profit organization that develops best practices.83 In short, the
cloud contract is a key tool to ensure adequate safeguards and to re-establish
custodian control and oversight.
(c) Jurisdictional
The ‘‘cloud” is an apt analogy for distributed, internationally dispersed,
remotely accessible computing. Data may either cross borders when transferred
to a foreign CSP, or cross ‘‘within” the cloud, between various facilities of a
multi-national CSP and its subcontractors. These internal transfers are typically
carried out for quality-of-service related reasons, namely for security, back-ups,
support, and cost efficiency.84 Transfers within the cloud can also occur between
CSPs and subcontracted CSPs in foreign jurisdictions. Users from a foreign
jurisdiction also may be allowed to download or remotely access data in the
cloud. Taken individually, none of these cross-border transfers are new, and
cross-border data transfer has been discussed in the legal literature for over 40
years.85 Information has long been outsourced for processing, transferred within
multinational corporations, and shared between researchers. But it is the routine
automation, combination, and abstraction of such transfers that make the cloud
a focal point for these concerns. The cloud also exacerbates confusion about
categories of cross-border data flows because it is becoming difficult to
distinguish between actively transmitting data and passively making it
available.86 International data sharing is also prominent in genomic research,
where combining datasets across borders can increase sample size, improve
statistical power, and accelerate findings. This data-sharing culture has been
supported by a global infrastructure of international research consortia and
public research platforms.87 In a sense, it is borderless-ness itself that attracts
health researchers to the cloud. But privacy concerns have led to restrictions on
international flows in Canada and elsewhere, which present a serious barrier to
international research collaborations.
PHI transferred to a foreign jurisdiction is vulnerable to compelled disclosure
under that jurisdiction’s law, notably for surveillance purposes by foreign law
enforcement. Compelled disclosure cannot be prevented through contractual
means.88 CSPs are a key target of compelled disclosure because of their
increasingly comprehensive stores of valuable information and because the
83 Cloud Security Alliance, supra note 71 at 92.
84 Dove et al, supra note 11.
85 See e.g., Allan Gotlieb, Charles Dalfen &Kenneth Katz, ‘‘The Transborder Transfer of
Information by Communications and Computer Systems: Issues and Approaches to
Guiding Principles” (1974) 68:2 A.J.I.L. 227.
86 Kuner, supra note 34 at 174-5.
87 Patricia Kosseim et al, ‘‘Building a Data SharingModel for Global Genomic Research”
(2014) 15:8 Genome Biology 430 at 430.
88 Katie Saulnier &Yann Joly, ‘‘Locating Biobanks in the Canadian PrivacyMaze” (2016)
44:1 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 7-19.
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‘‘architecture of the Cloud allows. . .surveillance to be accomplished with less
cost and effort, and more surreptitiously.”89 Because customer data is often
separated logically rather than physically, seizure of hardware targeting one
customer may, as a consequence, incidentally affect others. A recent trend among
CSPs to mitigate their customers’ fears is to publicly report on the degree to
which they are affected by these practices.90 More significant would be initiatives
such as the EU—U.S. data protection ‘‘umbrella agreement”, which aims to
place at least minimal restrictions on compelled disclosure to authorities.91
Data transfer to a foreign jurisdiction also makes it difficult for individuals
and custodians to enforce privacy related obligations, or for national privacy
authorities to monitor and enforce compliance.92 It may already be unclear what
laws apply in multi-jurisdictional research, and the cloud’s nascent stage and
porous character adds to this uncertainty.93 Cloud use complicates ascertaining
the applicable law to settle contractual disputes (where the contract is silent) and
for determining the proper jurisdictions for a participant to launch a complaint
against a CSP.94
Privacy concerns may discourage CSPs from accepting uncertain liability,
health sector custodians from adopting cloud services, and individuals from
partaking in services or research involving the cloud. In the next section, we
identify gaps where the Canadian privacy laws fail to address these privacy
concerns.
IV. REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE GAPS IN PRIVACY
PROTECTION
Accountable outsourcing to the cloud in the Canadian health sector is
undermined by the limited role of legislation in specifying:
1. how responsibilities are divided between custodian and CSP;
2. when foreign legal regimes allow ‘‘comparable protection” to be provided
at all; and
3. how the Fair Information Practice principle of transparency translates
into specific duties in the cloud.
89 Krebs, supra note 34 at 46.
90 See e.g., Google, ‘‘Google Transparency Report,” online: <google.com/transparen-
cyreport/userdatarequests/legalprocess>.
91 EC, Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the
Protection of Personal Information Relating to the Prevention, Investigation, Detection,
and Prosecution of Criminal Offences (Draft) (EC), online: <ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/dp-umbrella-agreement_en.pdf>.
92 OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013), online: <www.oecd.org/sti/
ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf> [OECD, 2013 Guidelines].
93 Simkevitz, supra note 7.
94 Krebs, supra note 34 at 50; OPC, ‘‘Reaching for the Clouds,” supra note 34.
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A sophisticated cloud contract is essential to address these uncertainties.
(a) Balancing Custodian and CSP Responsibilities
The primary challenge to privacy and security in the cloud is appropriately
dividing responsibility between custodians and CSPs. Depending on the
deployment model (see Table 2), CSPs may exercise overwhelming control
over personal information, privacy and security safeguards, and monitoring of
those safeguards.95 A fair balance of responsibilities is not guaranteed through
cloud contracts where the researcher and CSP do not have equal bargaining
power, and where the CSP reserves the right to unilaterally modify terms of their
agreement.
A sharp distinction is drawn between custodian and service provider under
Canadian laws. The minimal duties imposed on CSPs across Canada are to limit
use to authorized purposes and to install privacy safeguards. Statutes may
impose these conditions directly on CSPs, and/or indirectly by requiring
custodians to establish outsourcing contracts. Where service providers illegally
process PHI outside the custodian’s instructions, they are regulated directly as
custodians.96 This follows the same principle as the one in play in the context of a
limited partnership, where as soon as one of the limited partners begins to exert a
managerial role within the partnership, that partner immediately becomes liable
for the partnership’s debts as a general partner.97 The CSP becomes responsible
for compliance with custodians’ obligations.98 But given the complex, dynamic
exchange of data and provision of services in the cloud, it is difficult to assess
when the CSP steps outside of authorized purposes.99 Indeed, a CSP may
unilaterally determine many of the technical processes carried out on data, such
as creating copies and transferring them across borders for back-up purposes.
When do such processes fall outside custodians’ instructions?
One legislative approach for balancing obligations between custodians and
service providers is to impose a distinct set of privacy duties on service providers
directly. This approach is espoused by the European Commission, which
recommends better balancing of legislative obligations for controllers and
processors in the cloud context.100 But direct statutory regulation tends to be
inflexible, while an optimal allocation of responsibility will vary greatly
95 Canada Health Infoway, supra note 17.
96 OPC, ‘‘Reaching for the Clouds,” supra note 34 at 7.
97 See e.g.,LimitedPartnershipsAct,R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16, s. 13(1): ‘‘[a] limitedpartner is not
liable as a general partner unless . . . the limited partner takes part in the control of the
business.”
98 EC, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the Concepts of
‘‘Controller” and ‘‘Processor,” (Brussels, EC, 2010), online: <ec.europa.eu/justice/
policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf>; EC, Opinion 05/2012, supra note
51 at 3.3.1.
99 Krebs, supra note 34 at 42.
100 EC, Opinion 05/2012, supra note 51 at 23.
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depending on the context of the cloud relationship. In IaaS, the argument is
stronger that clients should be primarily accountable. The challenge of
appropriately dividing responsibility is further complicated by fast-moving
technological change, and the prevalence of subcontracting in the cloud industry.
The effectiveness of direct regulation of CSPs is also limited across borders.
The current Canadian approach relies heavily on the ‘‘accountability
principle”.101 Under PIPEDA, this principle requires that when a custodian
transfers PHI to a third party, the custodian must employ ‘‘contractual or other
means to provide a comparable level of protection” to that which is owed by the
custodian.102 Provincial health statutes mandate that custodians must conclude a
contract with the CSP. As a consequence, accountability prohibits custodians
from using the cloud where comparable protection cannot be provided. It
requires custodians to make a number of choices in the cloud context:
. whether to use the cloud at all;
. what types of data to move to the cloud;
. what deployment model to adopt; and
. what specific CSP(s) to engage.103
More guidance or requirements are needed to inform such decisions.104 Specific
statutory requirements—e.g., requiring custodians to conduct privacy impact
assessments before adopting a new practice—can reinforce accountability.105 On
a second level, accountability requires the establishment of the custodian-CSP
agreement that ensures comparable safeguards are in place and that custodial
control and oversight are maintained. Given the possible longevity of such
relationships, periodic privacy impact assessments, monitoring, and audits might
also be needed as contractual terms.
101 See especially OECD, 1980 Guidelines, supra note 47.
102 See e.g., PIPEDA, supra note 36, Schedule 1, 4.1.3. For other laws, see subsection on
‘‘Accountability Standard” below.
103 UK, Information Commissioner’s Office, Guidance on the Use of Cloud Computing
(2012) at 8, online: <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1540/
cloud_computing_guidance_for_organisations.pdf>.
104 Some guidance is available, see e.g., OPC, ‘‘Reaching for the Clouds,” supra note 34;
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, ‘‘Privacy in the Clouds: A White
Paper onPrivacy andDigital Identity: Implications for the Internet,” byAnnCavoukian
(Toronto: Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, 2008), online: <https://
www.ipc.on.ca/images/resources/privacyintheclouds.pdf>; Office of the Privacy Com-
missioner of Canada, Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta &
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, ‘‘Cloud
Computing for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Privacy Responsibilities and
Considerations” (OPC, OIPCAB, OIPCBC, 2012), online: OIPCBC <https://
www.oipc.bc.ca/guidance-documents/1437>.
105 See e.g., Alberta’s HIA, supra note 5, s. 64.
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(b) Assessing Protections under Foreign Laws
Transfer of PHI not only to another organization, but to one in a foreign
jurisdiction, raises distinct accountability issues. First, it may be practically more
difficult for custodians to enforce agreements with CSPs governed under foreign
laws and courts. Second, determining the jurisdiction of the Canadian Privacy
Commissioner over organizations based outside Canada is complex.106 Third,
PHI transferred to foreign jurisdictions is subject to compelled disclosure
provisions under foreign laws, most notably in the context of government
surveillance. These provisions typically trump contractual safeguards and could
adversely affect the privacy of Canadians. In addition, the very notion of a cloud
company or PHI being in a foreign jurisdiction is blurred. Is it the jurisdiction in
which the CSP does most of its work? Where the data are kept? The site of the
CSP’s corporate headquarters? Any place where the CSP keeps significant assets?
In Canada, accountability requires that custodians determine if privacy
protection provided by the laws of a foreign jurisdiction is comparable to that
of Canada.107 But should these determinations really be left to custodians, rather
than government or individuals?
In Europe, it is either the national data protection authority or the data
subject who typically decides whether an international transfer is acceptable. The
EU data protection framework restricts international transfers to processors in
jurisdictions outside the EU whose laws the European Commission has not
deemed ‘‘adequate.” Transfer may also proceed with the unambiguous consent
of the data subject. In stark contrast to the European approach, Canada’s
PIPEDA does not explicitly distinguish between transfer to local CSPs and those
in foreign jurisdictions. The OPC has offered interpretive guidance that, ‘‘at the
very least, a company in Canada that outsources information processing to the
United States should notify its customers that the information may be available
to the U.S. government or its agencies under a lawful order made in that
country”.108 This minimalist right to notification (and opt-out) falls short of the
European requirement of unambiguous consent of the ‘‘data subject”. Quebec’s
private sector privacy law is unique in specifically requiring individuals be
notified of the place where their PHI is sent if outside Quebec.109
106 A ‘‘real and substantial connection” test is applied. See, e.g., Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘PIPEDA Report of Findings @2015-002: Website that
Generates Revenue by Republishing Canadian Court Decisions and Allowing them to
be Indexed by Search Engines Contravened PIPEDA” (OPC, 15 June 2015), online:
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2015/2015_002_0605_e.asp>.
107 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘PIPEDA Case Summary #2008-394:
Outsourcing of Canada.com E-mail Services to U.S.-based Firm Raises Questions for
Subscribers” (OPC, 19 September 2008), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2008/
394_20080807_e.asp>.
108 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘PIPEDA Case Summary #2005-313:
Bank’s Notification to Customers Triggers Patriot Act Concerns” (OPC, 19 October
2005), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2005/313_20051019_e.asp>.
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In some provinces, governments do have a say whether extra-jurisdictional
transfer is acceptable. This is limited to PHI held by public bodies in British
Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Alberta. In British Columbia and Nova Scotia, PHI
held by public bodies cannot be transferred across borders without the
individual’s consent or ministerial approval.110 Alberta’s FIPPA and HIA do
not directly restrict transfers, but do make it an offence to answer to compelled
disclosures not authorized by Alberta law.111 Under the accountability principle,
would this not effectively prohibit extra-territorial PHI transfer by public bodies
or health custodians altogether?
With the Edward Snowden revelations112 and the European Court of
Justice’s decision invalidating the EU-U.S. Safe Harbour Agreement due to mass
government surveillance with limited judicial remedy,113 the spotlight is currently
on international data transfer. Despite being in a similar position to Europe, as
Canada is ‘‘a leading consumer but laggard in service provision”,114 Canadian
policy debate is surprisingly silent on cross-border issues. Once again, rules and
guidance for when custodians can transfer PHI abroad are needed, and
contractual requirements can also help mitigate unjustified intrusions of
Canadians’ privacy under foreign law.
(c) Meeting Transparency Obligations through Specific Contractual
Requirements
How does the cloud impact the realization the Fair Information Practice
principle of openness? This principle is an important reference for custodians
assessing whether a cloud contract offers comparable protection. The custodian’s
duty of openness, in particular, is threatened in the cloud.
109 Quebec’s PPIPS, supra note 36, s. 8(3).
110 Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act, S.N.S. 2006, c. 3, s. 5(1);
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165, s. 33.2 (in
2014, however, the Information & Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia issued
updated guidance allowing public bodies to store data outside the jurisdiction when a
technique called tokenization is appropriately employed, the implication being that this
approach complies with the law because tokenization pseudonymizes the portion of
personal data that is stored outside of the province. See Office of the Information &
Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, ‘‘Updated Guidance on the Storage of
Information Outside of Canada by Public Bodies” (Victoria: OIPCBC, 16 June 2014),
online: <oipc.bc.ca/public-comments/1649>.
111 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25, s. 92(3);
Alberta’s HIA, supra note 5, s. 107(5.1); see also Power, supra note 4 at 7.22—7.23.
112 See generally Edward J. Snowden, ‘‘TheWorld Says No to Surveillance,” Editorial, The
New York Times (4 June 2015), online: <www.nytimes.com>.
113 Schrems, supra note 3.
114 EC, European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion 4/2015: Towards a New Digital
Ethics: Data, Dignity and Technology (Brussels: EDPS, 2015), online: <https://
secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consulta-
tion/Opinions/2015/15-09-11_Data_Ethics_EN.pdf>.
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Custodians are required to make specific information about PHI
management policies and practices ‘‘readily available” to individuals in an
understandable form.115 How should this duty extend to the CSP? Custodians
cannot be open with individuals about data handling practices unless
information about the CSP’s privacy and security practices is readily available
to the custodian. Indeed, custodians should be able to ‘‘confirm what happens to
[PHI] after it is provided to a third-party service provider”.116 But CSPs may
believe that openness comes at the cost of security, as it gives insight into security
mechanisms to potential attackers. Information security experts insist that to
achieve ‘‘security through obscurity” in this way is undesirable and ineffective.117
Custodians also need to know about subcontracting practices and ensure
subcontractors adhere to the conditions in the cloud contract. Ideally, the
custodian should be asked to consent to subcontracting or should at least be
notified in a timely fashion.118 Specific information about subcontractors could
include the names, locations, and accountability measures in place.119 If public
disclosure of subcontracting practices creates a security risk, disclosure could be
made to the custodian in a general manner or under a non-disclosure agreement.
Breach notification requirements were raised under the 2013 OECD Data
Protection Guidelines, and recently incorporated into PIPEDA.120 They
typically require custodians to notify individuals or privacy authorities (or
service providers to notify custodians) of a breach that may adversely affect
individuals.121 The purposes of these requirements are to increase openness of an
organization’s information handling practices, support individuals’ right to
informational self-determination, strengthen best practices, and improve the
general public’s awareness of the gravity and scale of breaches.122 Breach
notification is currently required in four Canadian jurisdictions.123
115 See e.g., PIPEDA, supra note 36, Schedule 1, 4.8, 4.8.2.
116 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Legal Information Related to
PIPEDA: InterpretationBulletin” (OPC, 2012), online:<https://www.priv.gc.ca/leg_c/
interpretations_02_acc_e.asp>.
117 See e.g., PeterP. Swire, ‘‘AModel forWhenDisclosureHelps Security:What IsDifferent
about Computer and Network Security?” (2004) 3:1 J. Telecommunications & High
Technology L. 163 at 183.
118 International Organization for Standardization, ‘‘ISO/IEC 27018:2014: Information
Technology—Security Techniques—Code of Practice for Protection of Personally
Identifiable Information (PII) in Public Clouds Acting as PII Processors” (ISO, 2014) at
A7, online: <www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=61498> [ISO, ‘‘IEC
27018”]; EC, Opinion 05/2012, supra note 51 at 3.4.1.1.
119 EC, Opinion 05/2012, supra note 51 at 3.4.1.1.
120 OECD, 2013 Guidelines, supra note 92 at 26; see also requirements established under the
Digital PrivacyAct, S.C. 2015, c. 32, s. 10, which has received royal assent, andwill come
into force with regulations, online <https://openparliament.ca/bills/41-2/S-4/ >.
121 OECD, 2013 Guidelines, supra note 92 at 27.
122 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, ‘‘Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground” (2011) 63:2 Stan. L. Rev. 247 at 275—276.
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. Ontario’s PHIPA requires that a custodian notify an individual at the first
reasonable opportunity if PHI is stolen, lost, or accessed without
authorization.124 In addition, an agent must notify a custodian of a
breach.125
. Alberta’s PIPA requires that a custodian notify the Alberta Privacy
Commissioner where there is a real risk of significant harm, without
unreasonable delay.126
. Newfoundland’s PHIA requires reporting of a ‘‘material” breach to
privacy authorities.127
. In British Columbia, breach notification of authorities is not required, but
is encouraged.128
Attention also needs to be given to who will determine if a breach is ‘‘material.”
Where custodians have breach notification obligations, accountability dictates
that these obligations and the specific conditions which trigger them are clearly
articulated in cloud contracts.
V. GAPS IN PRIVACY PROTECTION IN CLOUD CONTRACTS
To support our legislative analysis, we also reviewed the current contractual
practices of six CSPs of various sizes based in the U.S., Canada and the EU.
Because some of these contracts were acquired during confidential negotiations,
we have omitted the names of the CSPs.
We have identified a number of gaps in the privacy protection provided by
their Terms of Service. Our review addressed five questions:
1. What restrictions exist on international data transfer?
2. Which law(s) apply to PHI in clouds?
3. Who is responsible for PHI in clouds?
4. What is regulated as PHI in clouds?
5. What privacy protection is currently provided?
We have made recommendations elsewhere about how these gaps can be
addressed by the contracting parties.129 However, given the imbalance of
123 Ontario’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 12; Alberta’s PIPA, supra note 49, s. 37.1;
Newfoundland’sPHIA, supra note 5, s. 15;NewBrunswick’sPHIPA, supra note 5, s. 49.
124 Ontario’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 12.
125 Ibid, s. 17(3).
126 Alberta’s PIPA, supra note 49, s. 34.1.
127 Newfoundland’s PHIA, supra note 5, s. 15(4).
128 Power, supra note 4 at 6.25.
129 For a comprehensive list of policy and contractual recommendations see Adrian
Thorogood et al, ‘‘Policy Brief: Protecting Privacy in Cloud-Based Genomic Research”
(Centre of Genomics and Policy, 2015), online: <www.genomicsandpolicy.org/
Ressources/20150729_PolicyBrief.pdf>.
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bargaining power in favour of large CSPs with respect to all but the largest of
their clients, and CSPs’ preference for standard form contracts, at least some of
these gaps can only be addressed top-down through regulation.
(a) What Privacy Protection is Currently Provided?
Multiple providers cited secure sockets layer (SSL) encryption as their
protection mechanism of choice, but this bears only on data in transit, not data
at rest, and is thus generally insufficient. While several organizations have
promoted the establishment of cloud privacy standards,130 these were not
referenced by the Terms of Service we reviewed. Other than the legislatively
driven U.S. HIPAA Business Associate Agreement requirements, the vast
majority of protections referenced in the various CSP Terms of Service are
industry driven, and none are Canadian per se.131 No CSPs made contractual
commitments to meet or maintain these standards.
(b) What is Regulated as PHI in Clouds?
Four of six providers did not include custodian’s data in their definition of
personal information. In effect, these CSPs do not acknowledge that they are
processors of personal information on behalf of the custodian. Would these
contracts meet the minimum contractual requirement for service contracts to
limit use to authorized purposes? One might infer that the decision not to include
custodian content in the definition of personal information may be tied to the
type of service being provided. For example, access to researcher content differs
between CSPs providing SaaS and IaaS, the latter of which is more often used by
researchers and largely the focus of the cloud implementations addressed in this
article. In the former, the CSP would necessarily be actively involved in the data
management, whereas in the latter, the provider may have no role whatsoever.
An analogy for IaaS may be that of a storage locker. The entity renting out the
locker does not maintain control over the content of the locker. Similarly, in
IaaS, the CSP, in effect, provides a virtual box in which custodians may store
their content. The CSP would not actively engage with such contents (at least not
by design) and would therefore not be able to, for example, encrypt the contents.
This may be the logic behind why providers do not include obligations to protect
PHI.
130 See e.g., EC, Cloud Select Industry Group on Service Level Agreements, online:
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/cloud-select-industry-group-service-level-
agreements>; ISO, ‘‘IEC 27018”, supra note 118.
131 BSA Software Alliance, ‘‘2013 BSA Global Cloud Computing Scorecard: Country:
Canada” (2013) at 2, online: <cloudscorecard.bsa.org/2013/assets/PDFs/country_re-
ports/Country_Report_Canada.pdf>: ‘‘Canada has not yet issued any formal guide-
lines, standards, or regulations regarding cloud computing security.However, Canadian
organizations may be influenced by relevant standards being developed by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States.”
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However, just as the entity renting out the storage locker may prevent the
owner from accessing it, or may maintain a master key to access its contents, so
too does the CSP have a super user account enabling the CSP to stop and start
access, and possibly to read or modify the data. Some CSP personnel may also
have such access even where it is relegated to those on a ‘‘need-to-know” basis.
This weakens the argument that the CSP is not processing PHI. For health
custodians, the primary concern is individuals’ PHI placed in the cloud. Indeed,
in research, the efficient analysis of vast datasets of individual data is the main
driver behind seeking a cloud-based solution. For this reason, a definition of PHI
that does not include custodian data presents a significant gap in the approach to
its regulation and, ultimately, its protection.
(c) Who is Responsible for PHI in Clouds?
All the CSPs reviewed limit their privacy obligations to PHI they collect
about their clients, excluding PHI contained within client data. This leaves the
custodian solely responsible for PHI in the cloud. Again, this presents a
pronounced risk to privacy, especially where the custodian stores large genomic
datasets. Researchers, as custodians, are accountable for participant PHI
throughout the data lifecycle. Custodian obligations ought to extend to
CSPs—both obligations to safeguard PHI and obligations arising where such
safeguards fail, including breach notification, indemnification, and acceptance of
liability for damages caused by the CSP’s negligence or misconduct. Again, the
role of the CSP will differ depending on the service model. However, absent
appropriate contractual provisions requiring specific safeguards, addressing
breach notification, and recognizing CSP liability, it is unclear whether
custodians can ensure that participant privacy is adequately protected in the
cloud.
(d) Which Law(s) Apply to PHI in Clouds?
Extraterritoriality and enforceability have always been challenges in the
online world. Some of the earliest cases coincided with the growth of the modern
Internet dating back to the mid-’90s.132 But while the early days saw an Internet
that connected two points with a largely passive network in between such points,
cloud computing enables processing in multiple locations. In such cases there
may be several legal systems with potential relevance to the contract. Today, it is
much easier to argue that any law may apply, provided it is connected to the
activity of interest.133 In the cloud, potentially any node found along the path of
a given computation or transmission may also provide enough of a connection to
132 See e.g., Inset Systems Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F.Supp. 161 (D. Conn., 1996);
BensusanRestaurantCorp. v. King, 937F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. ,1996), and perhapsmost
notably,ZippoManufacturing Co. v. ZippoDot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (U.S.W.D.
Pa., 1997).
133 See Society of Composers, Authors Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of
Internet Providers, 2004 CSC 45, 2004 SCC 45, 2004 CarswellNat 1919, 2004
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assert jurisdiction. While there is good reason for the parties to contractually
submit to the jurisdiction of the CSP, good argument can also be made that the
law of the custodian’s or individuals’ jurisdiction should apply. Where this
cannot be done, accountability requires that the custodian consider if additional
duties derived from local laws need to be imposed through contract.
(e) What Restrictions Exist on International Data Transfer?
The issues raised by international data transfer are not dissimilar to those of
application of law. The problem with international data transfer is that, as
mentioned earlier, where a site has a connection to the data, the application of
that site’s law may follow. In other words, if the researcher’s data is moved from
a data centre in Canada to one in the U.S., U.S. law may apply. In addition to
lack of certainty around the applicable law, data might be subject to law
enforcement requests from agencies in other jurisdictions. These issues are
exacerbated further where there is no notice requirement by the CSP either in
advance of an international transfer, or in advance of a request by law
enforcement for access to the data.
Elsewhere we have provided best practice recommendations for contracting
in the cloud, and have created a checklist for cloud contracting for genomic
researchers.134 These resources can help healthcare providers, researchers, and
CSPs alike ensure the privacy of Canadians is protected in the cloud. Legal
reform also will be necessary to promote privacy in the cloud, and, as we argue in
the next section, must be carried out in a harmonized manner.
VI. DISCREPANCIES ACROSS PROVINCES AFFECTING
INTEROPERABILITY OF CLOUD CONTRACTS
This section identifies discrepancies between Canadian laws applying to PHI.
Such discrepancies create confusion over already vague standards and raise
doubts about the interoperability of cloud contracts across provinces. The cloud
business model underlying scalability and cost effectiveness relies on standard
service offerings framed by standard form contracts. Even where arguably
technical, these discrepancies make it difficult to be sure that a given cloud
contract is legally compliant across provinces. Uncertainty over compliance,
especially given the small size of some provincial health sectors, may discourage
companies from crafting Canadian-specific contracts. They are more likely to
espouse a ‘‘take it or leave it” approach (such as ‘‘HIPAA” compliant services in
Canada). Such an approach imposes a heavy burden of compliance assessment
on custodians, who remain accountable for PHI transferred to the cloud.
CarswellNat 1920, REJB 2004-66511, (sub nom. Socan v. Canadian Assn. of Internet
Providers) [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, [2004] S.C.J. No. 44 (S.C.C.).
134 Thorogood et al, supra note 129; Centre of Genomics and Policy, ‘‘Annex 1: Contract
Checklist for Cloud-Based Genomic Research” (Centre of Genomics and Policy, 2015),
online: <www.genomicsandpolicy.org/Ressources/20150728_Annex1.pdf>.
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(a) Definition of ‘‘Identifiable”
It is increasingly uncertain when information, particularly health
information, is considered ‘‘identifiable” and thus governed by privacy laws.135
This uncertainty is of great concern to the research community, which has
traditionally relied heavily on de-identification, thereby avoiding the application
of privacy laws. Uncertainty over de-identification is particularly acute in
genetics because every individual has a unique genetic make-up. The genome is
akin to a bar code, a unique tracing tag for an individual. Researchers have
demonstrated that it is technically possible to detect an individual’s presence
within pooled genotype data, such as the aggregated results of genomic
studies.136 Concerns have centred on the risk of re-identification from de-
identified genetic databases or study results. It is feared that an individual will be
identified within a dataset, and that potentially sensitive health information
about that individual will be revealed. What is ‘‘identifiable” is also a moving
target:
as more and more personal information is collected about individuals
and disseminated in various public sources and fora, there is an
increasing likelihood that the information could be aggregated, cross-
referenced, and linked in order to re-identify previously de-identified
records.137
In the cloud, encryption and access controls further complicate the legal
determination of whether information is identifiable.138
To complicate the matter, the legal definition of ‘‘identifiable” varies between
Canadian provinces. Some do not define the term or define it in a circular
manner (e.g., ‘‘[i]nformation about an identifiable individual”). Others consider
information to be ‘‘identifiable” if it ‘‘allows identification,” if identity is ‘‘readily
ascertainable,” or if identification is ‘‘reasonably foreseeable.”139 Still others
135 PaulM. Schwartz, ‘‘Information Privacy in theCloud” (2013) 161:6U. Pa. L.Rev. 1623;
Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J Solove, ‘‘Reconciling Personal Information in the United
States and European Union” (2014) 102:4 Cal. L. Rev. 877; Paul Ohm, ‘‘Broken
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization” (2010)
57:6 UCLA L. Rev. 1701.
136 Nils Homer et al, ‘‘Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA to
Highly Complex Mixtures Using HighDensity SNP Genotyping Microarrays,” online:
(2008) 4:8 PLoS Genetics e1000167 <journals.plos.org/plosgenetics/arti-
cle?id=10.1371/journal.pgen.1000167>. See also Anne S.Y. Cheung, ‘‘Re-Personaliz-
ing Personal Data in the Cloud” inAnne S.Y. Cheung&Rolf HWeber, eds, Privacy and
Legal Issues in Cloud Computing (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2015) 69 at 70.
137 Patricia Kosseim & Megan Brady, ‘‘Policy by Procrastination: Secondary Use of
Electronic Health Records for Health Research Purposes” (2008) 2:1 McGill J.L. &
Health 5 at 28.
138 W, Kuan Hon, ChristopherMillard & IanWalden, ‘‘The Problem of ‘Personal Data’ in
CloudComputing:What Information IsRegulated?—theCloudofUnknowing.” (2011)
1:4 Intl Data Privacy L. 211.
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explicitly include indirect identifiers (those that need to be combined with other
information to identify an individual) in the definition. Some statutes define and
specifically exempt ‘‘de-identified” information from the definition of
identifiable, even though by definition it is information that has been rendered
non-identifiable.140 As a particularly confusing example, article 1 of Prince
Edward Island’s HIA defines ‘‘identifying” by one legal standard (reasonably
foreseeable), and ‘‘de-identified” by another (identity cannot be ‘‘readily
ascertained”).
Canadian health researchers must contend with yet more definitions. The
Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans
(TCPS),141 applies only to research on human subjects. This definition includes
research involving personally identifiable information. However, the TCPS goes
on to discuss privacy risks along a spectrum from identifiable to coded to
anonymized to anonymous, and requires researchers to employ safeguards
proportionate to the risk of re-identification.142 The TCPS definitions of coded
and anonymized (respectively, the reversible/irreversible removal of direct
identifiers) differs from the definition of de-identified in Canadian health
sector laws (i.e., information rendered non-identifiable). Coding and
anonymization are essential technical safeguards for privacy in research, but
applying these processes does not necessarily resolve the question of whether the
TCPS continues to apply.143 Other questions remain unanswered: does
‘‘identifiability” depend on who can (or could foreseeably) access the
information? Consider the case where identifiers are removed from genetic
information and replaced with a code. The genetic information remains
identifiable to the researcher with the code, but may not be identifiable for a
researcher with only the coded information.144
An emerging approach recognizing the limits of de-identification is to simply
prohibit re-identification. This strategy could be adopted by custodians for cloud
contracts (or even by Canadian legislators). HIPAA requires that researchers
accessing information that is de-identified under a Safe Harbour exception
commit data custodians to ‘‘[n]ot identify the information or contact the
individuals”.145 A U.S. Federal Trade Commission Report on consumer privacy
139 See Appendix 1, below.
140 See Council of Canadian Academies, supra note 49; Saskatchewan’s HIPA, supra note
36, s. 3(2);Manitoba’sPHIA, supra note 36, s. 3;NewBrunswick’sPHIPA, supra note 5,
s. 3(2)(a); Nova Scotia’s PHIA, supra note 36, s. 5(2)(a).
141 TCPS, supra note 4.
142 Ibid at 5A.
143 Bartha M. Knoppers et al, ‘‘Questioning the Limits of Genomic Privacy,” Letter to the
Editor, (2012) 91:3 American J. Human Genetics 577.
144 This distinction was recognized in Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
‘‘PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-018: Psychologist’s Anonymized Peer Review Notes
are the Personal Information of the Patient” (OPC, 18 June 2010), online: <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2009/2009_018_0223_e.asp>.
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proposes that commercial data be excluded if ‘‘the company commits publicly
not to re-identify it and, further, ensures through contractual or other
mechanisms that downstream users keep the data in a de-identified form.”146
New Zealand is considering explicitly prohibiting re-identifying data.147 The
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health, an international coalition of
individuals and institutions implicated in genomic medicine and research,
stipulates in its Responsible Data Sharing Framework that its members should not
attempt to re-identify participants in genomic research with de-identified data.148
Court decisions and OPC interpretations offer some guidance as to what is
identifiable information.149 But it is unclear if this guidance applies across all
statutes. We concur therefore with the findings of an expert task force that has
recommended ‘‘a consistent national approach to what kinds of information
should be removed from health data to make [it] de-identifiable” under Canadian
law.150
(b) Duty of Confidentiality
All provinces require that custodians protect the confidentiality of PHI
through security measures, but the specificity of these requirements varies. As
cloud contracts must ensure comparable protection, it would follow that the CSP
is bound to respect such requirements, even detailed ones. These duties should
also be passed on by the CSP to subcontractors, agents, and employees, and
should survive the termination of contracts.151 In most provinces, statutes
applying to PHI provide a briefly worded standard of confidentiality. Quebec’s
PPIPS, for example, requires that security measures be taken throughout the
145 HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 46, § 164.514(e).
146 Gehan Gunasekara, ‘‘Paddling in Unison or just Paddling? International Trends in
Reforming Information Privacy Law” (2014) 22:2 Intl. J.L. & I.T. 141 at 151; US,
Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change:




147 NZ,NewZealandDataFutures Forum, ‘‘Harnessing theEconomic and Social Power of
Data” at 21—22, online: <https://www.nzdatafutures.org.nz/sites/default/files/
NZDFF_harness-the-power.pdf>.
148 Global Alliance for Genomics and Health, Framework for Responsible Sharing of




149 See e.g., Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Legal Information Related to
PIPEDA: InterpretationBulletin” (OPC, 2015), online:<https://www.priv.gc.ca/leg_c/
interpretations_02_e.asp>.
150 Council of Canadian Academies, supra note 49 at 207.
151 ISO, ‘‘IEC 27018,” supra note 118 at A10.1.
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lifecycle of PHI that ‘‘are reasonable given the sensitivity of the information, the
purposes for which it is to be used, the quantity and distribution of the
information and the medium on which it is stored.”152 In Alberta, regulations
impose extensive duties of confidentiality on a health sector custodian. The
custodian must establish a written record of all administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards; designate a security officer; and periodically assess the
safeguards.153 A cloud contract for the Canadian health sector would need to
comply with the security requirements of the strictest province.
(c) Definition of Service Provider
Not all Canadian privacy laws explicitly define who or what constitutes a
service provider, and different terms are used by those that do. PIPEDA does not
define the term, but mentions ‘‘transfer[s] to . . . third part[ies] for processing”
when discussing accountability.154 All Canadian health information statutes
define or refer to ‘‘agent[s]”155 or ‘‘affiliate[s]”156 These terms are defined broadly
to capture any third party that acts on behalf of a custodian for the purposes of
the custodian,157 and in most cases includes employees.158 Agents are expressly
permitted to process PHI on behalf of the custodian.159 Canadian health privacy
laws also define service provider. An ‘‘information manager”160 or ‘‘information
management service provider”161 is an entity that processes PHI for or provides
information management or information technology services to a custodian.
Information managers are typically treated as a subset of agent, and are thereby
also permitted to receive and process PHI.
A number of health privacy laws distinguish between employees and service
providers in order to impose stricter contractual requirements on the latter.
Ontario’s PHIPA regulations refer to ‘‘a person who supplies services for the
purpose of enabling a health information custodian to use electronic means to
collect, use, modify, disclose, retain or dispose of personal health information,
and who is not an agent of the custodian.”162 The stricter contractual
152 Quebec’s PPIPS, supra note 36, s. 10; see also Ontario’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 12(1).
153 Alberta’sHIA, supra note 5,Health Information Regulations, Alta. Reg. 70/2001, s. 8(1)
[Alberta’s HIA Regs].
154 PIPEDA, supra note 36, Schedule 1, 4.1.3.
155 New Brunswick’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 1; Newfoundland’s PHIA, supra note 5, s.
2(1)(a); Ontario’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 2; Nova Scotia’s PHIA, supra note 36, s. 3(a);
Prince Edward Island’s HIA, supra note 36, s. 1(a).
156 Alberta’s HIA, supra note 5, s. 1(1)(a); Saskatchewan’s HIPA, supra note 36, s. 2(a).
157 See e.g., Ontario’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 2; Power, supra note 4 at 5.15.
158 CfManitoba’s PHIA, supra note 36.
159 Ontario’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 17.
160 Alberta’s HIA, supra note 5, s. 66(1); Manitoba’s PHIA, supra note 36, s. 1(1); New
Brunswick’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 1; Newfoundland’s PHIA, supra note 5, s. 2(1)(l).
161 Saskatchewan’s HIPA, supra note 36, s. 2(j).
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requirements imposed on service providers are discussed below. Ontario’s
PHIPA also defines an even more specific category: ‘‘health information network
provider” (HINP). A HINP is:
a person who provides services to two or more health information
custodians where the services are provided primarily to custodians to
enable the custodians to use electronic means to disclose personal
health information to one another, whether or not the person is an
agent of any of the custodians.
HINPs are subject to even more detailed contractual requirements, described
below.163
In Ontario, CSPs dealing with PHI would attract the stricter contractual
requirements of service provider and potentially, depending on the primary
purpose of the service, also those of HINPs. The existence of a separate regime
for HINPs, distinguished based on the networking service they provide, raises the
question of whether CSPs, or CSPs providing certain types of services, could be
similarly distinguished.
(d) Required Clauses in Service Provider Contracts
Cloud contracts are key to accountability and compliance. If custodians lack
sufficient bargaining power to impose comparable protection through
negotiation, however, they will be forced to choose between noncompliance
and forgoing the cloud. To relieve custodians of this dilemma, Canadian policy
makers should consider strengthening the statutory requirements for cloud
contracts. Beyond the basic conditions of limited use and confidentiality required
in outsourcing contracts, some Canadian health privacy statutes already require
additional contractual clauses. In Ontario and Newfoundland, health privacy
laws require that service providers ensure their privacy obligations are passed on
to employees or subcontractors.164 Alberta’s law has exceptionally detailed
conditions for an outsourcing agreement. An agreement must:
. identify the objective and principles of the agreement;
. identify permitted forms of processing;
. describe how access requests will be handled;
. describe how information will be protected;
. describe how information will be accessed; and
. describe how the agreement can be terminated.165
If the PHI leaves Alberta, the contract additionally must allow the custodian to
monitor compliance and contain remedies for non-compliance.166 Other
provinces require the outsourcing agreement to comply with regulations, but
162 Ontario’sPHIPA, supranote 5,General, O.Reg. 329/04, s. 6(1) [Ontario’sPHIPARegs].
163 Ibid, s. 6(2).
164 Ibid, s. 6(1); Newfoundland’s PHIA, supra note 5, s. 22(5).
165 Alberta’s HIA Regs, supra note 153, s. 7(2).
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have failed to issue regulations.167 These discrepancies seem a product of
evolutionary drift as some jurisdictions update their laws more frequently than
others, rather than purposeful design.
With the exception of HINPs, requirements for service provider contracts
under Canadian health privacy laws are more formal than substantive: the
contract must address certain issues, but there is no requirement as to how
responsibility should be divided. Formal requirements work to promote
transparency about how the parties will jointly address privacy, and in turn
promote accountability. Indeed, having the CSP spell out the limits of its
responsibility allows the custodian to better assess whether the CSP offers
comparable protection. They also allow a flexible division of responsibilities.
U.S. and EU laws, by contrast, have more extensive contractual requirements for
service providers than Alberta or Ontario. Contracts must address the binding of
employees and subcontractors, breach notification, notification of changes to
law or compelled disclosure requests, prior consent for subcontracting, and even
third party beneficiary clauses for data subjects.168 Given that contractual
requirements are an important means of ensuring accountability in the cloud, it is
concerning that Canadian provinces, to varying extents, inadequately address
this in their legislation.
Exceptionally, in Ontario, contracts between PHI custodians and HINPs
must include a number of substantive obligations. HINPs are required to notify
the custodian of unauthorized processing or a breach; make publicly available a
plain language description of their services and safeguards appropriate for
informing individuals; make publicly available directives, guidelines, or policies
that apply to the HINPs (unless commercially sensitive); keep records of all
access to PHI from the network and all transfers over the network; provide
written privacy and security assessments; and bind subcontractors.169 This
distinct regime, applicable to services that primarily provide networking between
two custodians, is unique under Canadian law. Could the HINP regime present a
potential model for distinguishing a regime specific to CSPs? This direction is
unlikely, considering the diversity of purposes for which CSPs are used. In
addition, a cloud specific regime may fail to provide sufficient flexibility. In
situations where a lesser degree of control over PHI is ceded to the CSP (e.g.,
166 Ibid, s. 8(4).
167 Saskatchewan’s HIPA, supra note 36, s. 63(1)(j); Manitoba’s PHIA, supra note 36, s.
25(3); Newfoundland’s PHIA, supra note 5, s. 22(2); New Brunswick’s PHIPA, supra
note 5, s. 52(3).
168 HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 46 at § 164.504 (e)(2)(ii); The EU standard contractual
clauses—for transfer to a processor in jurisdictions where the law has not explicitly been
deemed adequate: EC,Directorate—General Justice, CommissionDecisionC(2010)593
Standard Contractual Clauses (processors) (EC, 2014), online: <ec.europa.eu/justice/
data-protection/international-transfers/files/clauses_for_personal_data_transfer_pro-
cessors_c2010-593.doc>.
169 Ontario’s PHIPA Regs, supra note 162, s. 6(3).
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IaaS), applying extensive substantive requirements on CSPs would be
disproportionate and inappropriate.
(e) Accountability Standard
Privacy laws across Canada, ‘‘in one form or another, embody the principle
that organizations are accountable for the [PHI] in their custody and control.”170
Under PIPEDA, the accountability standard for transfers to third parties is
providing ‘‘a comparable level of protection” through contractual or other
means.171 British Columbia’s PIPA simply states that ‘‘[a]n organization is
responsible for personal information under its control, including personal
information that is not in the custody of the organization.”172 A written
agreement with an information manager under New Brunswick’s PHIPA or
Newfoundland’s PHIA must simply ‘‘provide for” the protection of the PHI.173
Quebec’s PPIPS has the most stringent accountability standard, requiring
custodians to take ‘‘all reasonable steps” to safeguard the privacy of personal
information.174 Is this variation merely terminological, or do custodians in some
provinces have a heightened duty to assess the risks of transfers to third parties
and foreign jurisdictions?175
(f) Transfer = ‘‘Use” or ‘‘Disclosure”?
Canadian privacy laws typically permit transfers to a service provider, where
certain conditions are met, by characterizing such a transfer as a ‘‘use” rather
than a ‘‘disclosure.” This is strange, as the common meaning of transfer is more
closely related to disclosure than to use. But this counter-intuitive
characterization is needed to permit transfer where the custodian already has
permission to use PHI for a given purpose. Treating transfer as a ‘‘use” also
clarifies that the service provider is not a custodian in respect of the PHI: if there
is no disclosure, there is no corresponding collection.176 PIPEDA does not
explicitly characterize a transfer to a service provider as a use, but this was done
by OPC interpretive guidance.177 Several health privacy laws clarify that a
170 Kosseim, Kardash & Penta, supra note 35 at 210.
171 PIPEDA, supra note 36, Schedule 1, 4.1.3.
172 British Columbia’s PIPA, supra note 49, s. 4(2).
173 NewBrunswick’sPHIPA, supra note 5, s. 52.(3);Newfoundland’sPHIA, supra note 5, s.
22(2).
174 Quebec’s PPIPS, supra note 36, s. 17.
175 Eloı̈se Gratton, ‘‘Privacy Interviews with Experts” (Nymity, 2014), online: <https://
www.nymity.com/~/media/Nymity/Files/Interviews/2014/2014-07-Gratton.pdf>.
176 See e.g., Alberta’s HIA, supra note 5, s. 66(7); Saskatchewan’s HIPA, supra note 36, s.
18(5); Manitoba’s PHIA, supra note 36, s. 25(5).
177 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘PIPEDA: Processing Personal Data
Across Borders: Guidelines” (OPC, 2009), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/informa-
tion/guide/2009/gl_dab_090127_e.pdf>.
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transfer to an agent is a ‘‘use” not a ‘‘disclosure.”178 By contrast, Alberta’s HIA
does not classify transfer as a use or a disclosure, but rather as a sui generis
transaction that does not require consent.179 Counter-intuitive and discrepant
classifications of ‘‘transfer” across provinces are confusing, and highlight that
categories of processing underpinning Canadian privacy laws (collection, use,
disclosure) are antiquated.
(g) Access for Health Research
Like service providers, Canadian privacy laws also permit transfers to
researchers without individual consent under certain conditions. Several
important variations between conditions across Canadian provinces have been
canvassed in-depth by an expert panel of the Council of Canadian Academies.180
Discrepancies include the type of body that must approve the research (e.g.,
ethics review board or privacy commissioner), situations where consent can be
foregone (e.g., impracticable), and the contractual terms to be included in a
custodian-researcher agreement. In data-centric sciences, such as genomics, the
cloud is an attractive platform for providing access to research data across wide
geographies. These discrepancies may concern researchers engaging CSPs to
share research data across Canada.
(h) Summary
There are many discrepancies across Canadian privacy laws that apply to
PHI. In many cases, these discrepancies are technical or terminological. In some
cases, the discrepancies are substantive and indicate that privacy protections are
weaker in some provinces. Requirements for custodian-service provider
agreements are not detailed, except in Ontario and Alberta. Provincially
applicable rulings and interpretations may exacerbate discrepancies in the
black letter of provincial regulatory frameworks. Even where discrepancies are
technical, they can create confusion. To give but one example, the European
Commission’s Article 29 Data Protection Working Party assessed PIPEDA as
‘‘adequate” for the purposes of transferring Europeans’ personal data to
commercial entities in Canada governed by that statute, but more recently
reached a negative finding for Quebec’s private sector law, even though it was
deemed substantially similar by an Order-in-Council,181 and arguably offers
178 Nova Scotia’s PHIA, supra note 36, s. 29(2); Ontario’s PHIPA, supra note 5, s. 6(1);
Ontario’s PHIPA Regs, supra note 162, s. 6(4) (transfer to non-agent goods, service
provider).
179 Alberta’s HIA, supra note 5, s. 66(3).
180 Council of Canadian Academies, supra note 49.
181 The Federal government declared Quebec’s legislation substantially similar to PIPEDA
in 2003. See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Legal information related
to PIPEDA: Substantially Similar Provincial Legislation” (OPC, 2003), online:
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/leg_c/legislation/leg-rp_030611_e.asp#provincial>. For dis-
cussion, see Jennifer Stoddart, Benny Chan & Yann Joly, ‘‘The European Union’s
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higher protection than PIPEDA.182 To be cost-effective in the relatively small
Canadian healthcare and health research market, CSPs need to develop standard
contracts that are legally compliant across jurisdictions.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has discussed three growing gaps in legal protection where
accountability for PHI in the cloud is at risk. First, Canadian privacy and health
privacy laws do not clarify how obligations are to be divided between custodians
and CSPs. Second, the challenge of assessing the risks of cross-border transfers in
Canada is largely left to custodians, who may not be well-equipped for the task.
Third, CSP data handling and security practices are obscure, threatening the
privacy principle of transparency. Moreover, our review of CSP Terms of Service
revealed that these legislative gaps are not rectified by standard form cloud
contracts typically on offer. Legislative intervention is therefore recommended to
ensure cloud services are available to support genomic research and medicine in a
manner that adequately protects the privacy of Canadian participants and
patients. This may be achieved through more prescriptive legislation that
establishes detailed requirements for contracts between custodians and service
providers. In addition, appropriate (but not overly restrictive) conditions for
cross-border transfers of PHI could also be considered.
Legislative efforts to protect privacy could also be reinforced by improved
cloud contracting practices. We have provided detailed recommendations for
custodians and for CSPs on how to improve cloud contracts elsewhere.183
Briefly, custodians should ensure that cloud contracts include comprehensive
technical, administrative, and physical safeguards clauses meeting industry
standards and subject to periodic, independent audits.184 Custodians should
ensure that contractual obligations imposed on CSPs extend to their employees
and subcontractors. The CSP should be bound to ensure the availability of
service and the integrity of data during the full lifecycle of data processing.
Adequate notice periods should be provided for suspension of or changes to
services, such as the location of data storage. Finally, the CSP should assume
liability for damages resulting from its own negligence or misconduct.
We also recommend that efforts to enhance legislative protections for
privacy in the cloud be harmonized across jurisdictions. A host of discrepancies
already exist between Canadian privacy laws, concerning:
Adequacy Approach to Privacy and International Data Sharing in Health Research”
(2016) 44:1 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 143-155.
182 Gratton, supra note 175: ‘‘Q:When is adequacy never adequate? A.WhenQuébec’s data
protection law is considered ‘inadequate’ for Europe.”
183 See Thorogood et al, supra note 129, andCentre ofGenomics and Policy, supra note 134.
184 In the case of IaaS, audit may be largely limited to the physical premises of the CSP.
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. When is data transferred to the cloud considered identifiable, and thus
governed by privacy law?
. How exactly are CSPs defined?
. When is transfer of PHI to the cloud prohibited?
. What provisions must be included in a cloud contract?
. How can these contracts be monitored and enforced by custodians?
. And how can Canadian patients and research participants enforce their
privacy rights in the cloud?
Without a harmonized effort, discrepancies may become more pronounced and
privacy protections put more at risk.
It appears that the future of healthcare and health research will involve
genomics, big data and, of course, cloud computing. In order to ensure privacy is
not compromised, and to enhance transparency and accountability in the cloud,
regulators should provide clear rules of engagement for custodians and CSPs.
Appendix 1: Table of Key Privacy Statutes in Canada
Canada (Federal) Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21.
. Privacy Regulations, SOR/83-508.
. Privacy Act Extension Order, No. 1, SOR/83-553.
. Privacy Act Extension Order, No. 2, SOR/89-206.
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5.
. Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information,
SOR/2001-7.
. Organizations in the Province of British Columbia Ex-
emption Order, SOR/2004-220.
. Organizations in the Province of Alberta Exemption Order,
SOR/2004-219.
. Health Information Custodians in the Province of Ontario
Exemption Order, SOR/2005-399.
. Organizations in the Province of Quebec Exemption Order,
SOR/2003-374.
. PersonalHealth InformationCustodians inNewBrunswick
Exemption Order, SOR/2011-265.
. Personal Health Information Custodians in Newfoundland
and Labrador Exemption Order, SI/2012-72.
British Columbia Personal Information Protection Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 63.
. Personal Information Protection Act Regulations, B.C.
Reg. 473/2003.
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165.
. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
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Regulation, B.C. Reg. 155/2012.
Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373.
E-Health (PersonalHealth InformationAccess andProtection
Act of Privacy) Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 38.
. Disclosure Directive Regulation, B.C. Reg. 172/2009.
. E-Health Regulation, B.C. Reg. 129/2011.
Alberta Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5.
. Personal Information Protection Act Regulation, Alta.
Reg. 366/2003.
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A.
2000, c. F-25.
. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Regulation, Alta. Reg. 186/2008.
. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
(Ministerial) Regulation, Alta. Reg. 56/2009.
Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5.
. Health Information Regulation, Alta. Reg. 70/2001.
. Alberta Electronic Health Record Regulation, Alta. Reg.
118/2010.
. Designation Regulation, Alta. Reg. 69/2001.
Saskatchewan The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
S.S. 1990-91, c. F-22.01.
. The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Regulations, R.R.S., c. F-22.01, Reg. 1.
TheHealth Information Protection Act, S.S. 1999, c. H-0.021.
. Health Information Protection Regulations, R.R.S., c. H-
0.021, Reg. 1.
TheLocal Authority Freedomof Information andProtection of
Privacy Act, S.S. 1990-91, c. L-27.1.
. Local Authority Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Regulations, R.R.S., c. L-27.1, Reg. 1.
The Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24.
Manitoba The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
S.M. 2008, c. 40.
. Access and Privacy Regulation, Man. Reg. 64/98.
The Personal Health Information Act, S.M. 2013, c. 22.
. Personal Health Information Regulation, Man. Reg. 245/
97.
The Privacy Act, C.C.S.M., c. P125.
The Personal Information Protection and Identity Theft
Prevention Act, S.M. 2013, c. 17.
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Ontario Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O.
1990, c. F.31.
. General, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 460.
. Disposal of Personal Information, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 459.
Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56.
. General, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 823.
Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004, S.O. 2004,
c. 3, Schedule A.
. General, O. Reg. 329/04.
Quality of Care Information Protection Act, 2004, S.O. 2004,
c. 3, Schedule B.
. General, O. Reg. 330/04.
. Definition of ‘‘Quality of Care Committee,” O. Reg. 297/
04.
Quebec An Act respecting access to documents held by public bodies
and the protection of personal information, R.S.Q., c. A-2.1.
. Regulation respecting the distribution of information and
the protection of personal information, C.Q.L.R., c. A-2.1.
. Regulation respecting public bodies that must refuse to
release or to confirm the existence of certain information,
C.Q.L.R., c. A-2.1.
An Act respecting the protection of personal information in the
private sector, R.S.Q., c. P-39.1.
AnAct respecting health services and social services, R.S.Q., c.
S-4.2
. Regulation respecting the information that institutionsmust
provide to the Minister of Health and Social Services,
C.Q.L.R., c. S-4.2.
An Act respecting the sharing of certain health information,
R.S.Q., c. P-9.0001.
. Regulation respecting access authorizations and the dura-
tion of use of information held in a health information bank
in a clinical domain, C.Q.L.R., c. P-9.0001.
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64..
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12.
New Brunswick Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.B.
2009, c. R-10.6.
. General Regulation, N.B. Reg. 2010-111.
Personal Health Information Privacy and Access Act, S.N.B.
2009, c. P-7.05.
. General Regulation, N.B. Reg. 2010-112.
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Prince Edward Is-
land
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
R.S.P.E.I 1988, c. F-15.01.
. General Regulations, P.E.I. Reg. EC564/02.
Health Information Act, S.P.E.I. 2014, c. 31 [not yet in force].
Nova Scotia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.S.
1993, c. 5.
. Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 105/94.
Municipal Government Act, S.N.S. 1998, c. 18.
Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act,
S.N.S. 2006, c. 3.
. Personal Information International Disclosure Protection
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 113/2008.
Personal Health Information Act, S.N.S. 2010, c. 41.
. Personal Health Information Regulations, N.S. Reg. 217/
2012.
Privacy Review Officer Act, S.N.S. 2008, c. 42.
Newfoundland &
Labrador
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.N.L.
2015, c. A-1.2.
. Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Regula-
tions, N.L.R. 11/07.
Personal Health Information Act, S.N.L. 2008, c. P-7.01.
. Personal Health Information Regulations, N.L.R. 38/11.
Privacy Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. P-22.
Health Research Ethics Authority Act, S.N.L. 2006, c. H-1.2.
. Health Research Ethics Authority Regulations, N.L.R. 57/
11.
Yukon Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.Y.
2002, c. 1.
. Access to Information Regulation, Y.O.I.C. 1996/053.




Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
S.N.W.T. 1994, c. 20.
. Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Regula-
tions, N.W.T. Reg. 206-96.
Nunavut Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, S.Nu.
1994, c. 20.
. Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Regula-
tions, N.W.T. (Nu.) 206-96.
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